quantum key distribution (QKD) represents a novel QKD approach whose principal merit is to beat the point-to-point private capacity of a lossy quantum channel, thanks to performing single-photon interference in an untrusted node. Indeed, recent security proofs of various TF-QKD type protocols have confirmed that the secret key rate of these schemes scales essentially as the square root of the transmittance of the channel. Here, we focus on the TF-QKD protocol introduced by Curty et al., whose secret key rate is nearly an order of magnitude higher than previous solutions. Its security relies on the estimation of the detection probabilities associated to various photon-number states through the decoy-state method. We derive analytical bounds on these quantities assuming that each party uses either two, three or four decoy intensity settings, and we investigate the protocol's performance in this scenario. Our simulations show that two decoy intensity settings are enough to beat the point-to-point private capacity of the channel, and that the use of four decoys is already basically optimal, in the sense that it almost reproduces the ideal scenario of infinite decoys. We also observe that the protocol seems to be quite robust against intensity fluctuations of the optical pulses prepared by the parties.
Bob phase reference
As discussed above, we consider the TF-QKD protocol presented in [33] and sketched in figure 1. Alice and Bob establish a secret shared key by sending optical pulses to a central untrusted node, C. It is assumed that the node C shares a phase reference with Alice and Bob, which can be achieved by the transmission of strong optical pulses. The protocol is composed of the following five steps:
(i) Alice (Bob) chooses the X-basis with probability p X and the Z-basis with probability p Z = 1 − p X . Upon choosing the X-basis, Alice (Bob) prepares an optical pulse in a coherent state |α or |−α at random, corresponding to the key bit b A = 0 (b B = 0) or b A = 1 (b B = 1), respectively. Upon choosing the Z-basis, she (he) prepares an optical pulse in a phase-randomized coherent state:
A n! |n n| (1.1) (ρ β B ) whose intensity β 2 A (β 2 B ) is drawn randomly from a set S A = {β 2 i } i (S B = {β 2 j } j ) of real nonnegative numbers. (ii) Both parties send their optical pulses to the untrusted node C via optical channels in a synchronized manner. (iii) The central node C applies a balanced beamsplitter to the incoming pulses and features two threshold detectors at its output ports. The detector placed at the output port associated to constructive (destructive) interference is denoted by D c (D d ). (iv) The node C announces the measurement outcome k c (k d ) of detector D c (D d ), with k c = 0 and k c = 1 (k d = 0 and k d = 1) corresponding to a no-click and a click event, respectively. (v) Alice and Bob form their raw keys with the bits b A and b B collected when both parties chose the X-basis and node C reported a click in only one detector (k c + k d = 1). Bob flips his bits b B for which the click occurred in D d .
Secret key rate formula
The security analysis performed in [33] yields the following lower bound on the asymptotic key rate R:
R ≥ max{R 10 , 0} + max{R 01 , 0} , (1.2) where the terms R kck d , for (k c , k d ) ∈ {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, are defined as:
with h(x) = −x log 2 x − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) being the binary entropy function, f the inefficiency function associated to error correction, and p(k c , k d ) the conditional probability that node C announces the outcome (k c , k d ) when both parties selected the X-basis. The probability p(k c , k d ) can be expressed as:
where p(b A , b B ) is the joint probability of Alice and Bob preparing the coherent states |(−1) b A α and |(−1) b B α , respectively. According to the protocol description above, we have:
instead denotes the conditional probability that node C announced (k c , k d ) given that Alice and Bob sent the coherent states |(−1) b A α and |(−1) b B α , respectively. Since we consider the asymptotic key-rate scenario, we assume that p(k c , k d |b A , b B ) coincides with the correspondent distribution observed by the parties. Finally, the terms e kck d and e ph kck d in (1.3) represent the bit-error rate in the X-basis and an upper bound on the phase-error rate, respectively. The former is defined as:
, (1.6) and the latter as: where the coefficients c n are defined as c n = e −α 2 2 α n / √ n! and the yields Y kc,k d nm are the conditional probabilities that node C announces the outcome (k c , k d ) given that Alice and Bob emitted an n-photon state and an m-photon state, respectively. Note that the only yields contributing to (1.7) are those Y kc,k d nm such that n + m is an even number. The yields Y kc,k d nm are quantities that are not directly observed by the parties, however they can be estimated either numerically or analytically with techniques based on the decoy-state method [35] [36] [37] . Here we consider the analytical approach. In particular, we assume that Alice and Bob have at their disposal either two, three or four decoy intensity settings when choosing the Z-basis. To each further decoy intensity correspond additional linear constraints on the yields, leading to tighter estimations of Y kc,k d nm and thus to a higher key rate. However, a finite number of decoys only allows to derive non-trivial upper bounds ‡ on a limited number of yields in (1.7) , whereas the other yields are set to 1. Nevertheless, even bounding just four yields in a non-trivial way is enough for the secret key rate to beat the pointto-point private capacity bound (PLOB bound) [19] at high losses (see Sec. 3) . Also, as we show below, with four decoy intensity settings one can already obtain a secret key rate very close to that achievable with infinite decoy intensity settings. We remark that standard decoy-state-based QKD protocols require to lower bound the value of a few yields (typically those associated to vacuum and single-photon pulses) [39] , while the TF-QKD protocol considered here upper bounds the value of the phase-error rate (1.7) by upper bounding several yields. In particular, we upper bound the yields Y kc,k d nm for (n, m) ∈ I, where I is a certain subset of {(n, m)| n, m ∈ N 0 } which depends on the number of decoys. Thanks to the derived upper bounds on the yields (which we shall denote by Y U, kc,k d nm ) we are able to estimate the phase error rate (1.7) as follows:
(1.8)
Yields estimation
When both Alice and Bob choose the Z-basis in the first step of the TF-QKD protocol, they prepare phase-randomized coherent states with intensities β 2 A and β 2 B , respectively, and send them to C. From Eve's viewpoint, she cannot distinguish this scenario from the case in which the parties prepared number states |n and |m according to the Poissonian distributions P β 2 A (n) and P β 2 B (m) (see Eq. 1.1), where P µ (n) = e −µ µ n /n!. Therefore Eve's attack can only depend on the number states |n and |m but not on the signals' intensities β 2 A and β 2 B . As a consequence, the probability that Eve announces outcomes (k c , k d ) only depends on the number of photons (n, m) she received from Alice and Bob, i.e. the yields Y kc,k d nm are independent of the decoy intensities chosen by the parties. For this reason, one can derive a set of linear constraints on the yields Y kc,k d nm by expressing the experimentally observed gains Q β 2 A ,β 2 B kc,k d -which are defined as the conditional probabilities that node C announced the outcome (k c , k d ) given that Alice and Bob sent phase-randomized coherent states of intensities β 2 A and β 2 B , respectively-in terms of the yields:
(2.1)
As it is clear from (2.1), to every distinct pair of decoy intensities (β 2 A , β 2 B ) corresponds a new constraint on the set of infinite yields {Y kc,k d nm } n,m , which leads to tighter upper bounds and thus to a higher secret key rate. On the other hand, having a large number of decoy intensities is experimentally demanding, hence the need to derive the tightest possible bounds on the yields with a limited number of decoys.
In this Section we present a simple analytical method to obtain tight bounds on the yields of largest contribution § in (1.7) -i.e. relative to the largest coefficients c n -when the parties use two intensity settings in the Z-basis. Such a procedure can be readily extended to the case of three and four decoy intensity settings. The results for these last two cases are presented in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. From now on, we assume that both optical channels linking the parties to the central node C have the ‡ Every yield is a probability, thus it is trivially bounded by 1. § The same method can -in principle-be applied to any yield, however the limited number of decoy settings prevents from obtaining a non-trivial bound on every yield. same transmittance √ η. Therefore the set of optimal decoy intensities β 2 A and β 2 B is the same for both parties [40] and we define it as: {µ 0 , µ 1 }. In order to simplify the notation, we also omit the measurement outcome (k c , k d ) from the constraints given by (2.1). Hence the yields are subjected to the following four equality constraints:
2)
and to the inequality constraints:
Below we derive upper bounds on the yields: Y 00 , Y 11 , Y 02 and Y 20 .
Upper bound on Y 11
Consider the following combination of gains:
The subscript in G 11 indicates the yield that is going to be bounded with this combination of gains. In (2.4) the coefficients of the yields Y 0m and Y n0 , for any n and m, are identically zero. Thus (2.4) can be rewritten as:
We observe that the coefficients that multiply the yields Y nm are always positive, being the product of two factors of equal sign. A valid upper bound for Y 11 is obtained considering the worst-case scenario for the other yields, taking into account that (2.3) holds. Since all the yields' coefficients carry the same sign in (2.5) -regardless of the relation between µ 0 and µ 1 -, the yield Y 11 is maximal when all the other yields are minimal. Thus the upper bound on Y 11 is extracted by setting all the other yields to zero in (2.5):
where G 11 is defined in (2.4) .
We remark that by combining the gains as in (2.4), we manage to obtain a closed expression for Y 11 in which the contribution of all the yields Y 0m and Y n0 is removed. Additionally, Y 11 is now the yield with the "highest weight" in (2.5) since it has the largest coefficient. All the yields' bounds presented in this work follow the same philosophy.
Upper bound on Y 02
In (2.7) the coefficients of the yields Y n0 and Y 1m are identically zero. Thus (2.7) can be rewritten as:
Like in the derivation of Y 11 's bound given by (2.6), a valid upper bound for Y 02 is obtained by considering the worst-case scenario for the remaining yields in (2.8) . More specifically, Y 02 is maximal when the yields whose coefficient has the same sign as Y 02 's coefficient are minimal, and the yields whose coefficient has opposite sign to Y 02 's are maximal. Recalling constraint (2.3), this means setting Y 01 and Y 0m to zero and Y nm with n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1, to 1 in (2.8). In so doing, after rearranging the terms we obtain:
which leads to the following upper bound on Y 02 :
(2.10)
Upper bound on Y 20
In (2.11) the coefficients of the yields Y n1 and Y 0m are identically zero. Thus (2.11) can be rewritten as:
A valid upper bound for Y 20 is obtained by setting to zero the yields whose coefficient has the same sign as Y 20 's coefficient, and by setting to 1 the yields whose coefficient has opposite sign to Y 20 's. In the case of (2.12) this means setting Y 10 and Y n0 to zero and Y nm with n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 2, to 1. In this way we obtain:
which leads to the following upper bound on Y 20 :
(2.14)
Upper bound on Y 00
In (2.15) the coefficients of the yields Y 1m and Y n1 , for any n and m, are identically zero. Thus (2.15) can be rewritten as:
As usual we extract an upper bound on Y 00 by setting to their lowest value the yields whose coefficient has the same sign as Y 00 's coefficient (which correspond to the Y nm with n, m ≥ 2), and by setting to their maximum value the yields whose coefficient has opposite sign to Y 00 's coefficient (which correspond to Y 0m and Y n0 ). We know that every yield is trivially bounded by (2.3). However, in order to derive a tighter bound on Y 00 , we employ non-trivial bounds for all the yields Y nm with n + m ≤ 4 in (2.16). The upper bound on Y 00 thus satisfies:
In this equation Y U ij are upper bounds and Y L ij are lower bounds. From (2.17) we obtain the following upper bound on Y 00 :
where Y U 02 and Y U 20 are given in (2.10) and (2.14), respectively. The expressions for Y U 03 and Y U 04 in (2.18) can be found by starting from the same expression (2.8) that we used to derive Y U 02 , i.e.:
From this expression we can extract an upper bound on any generic Y 0m as follows:
where we employ the constraint (2.3). Similarly, the expressions for Y U 30 and Y U 40 are obtained starting from (2.12) and deriving an upper bound on a generic Y n0 as follows:
At last, the expression for Y L 22 can be derived from the same combination of yields which led to Y U 11 . In particular, from (2.5) we have that:
Then, by setting to 1 all the yields whose coefficient has equal sign to Y 22 's we obtain:
which yields:
(2.23)
Note that the upper bounds derived on Y 04 and Y 40 in this Section could be used to improve the estimation of the phase error rate given by (1.8) . However, the resulting improvement in the secret key rate would be extremely small in this case and we neglect it for simplicity.
Simulations
In this Section we provide plots of the secret key rate given by (1.2) against the overall loss (−10 log 10 η) measured in dB of the two optical channels linking Alice and Bob to node C. The channel model we use to simulate the quantities that would be observed experimentally -i.e. the gains p(k c , k d |b A , b B ) and
kc,k d -is given in Appendix A [33] . It accounts for: the loss in the optical channels together with the non-unity detection efficiency of D c and D d (altogether described by the parameter η), the polarization and phase misalignments introduced by the channel and a dark count probability p d in each detector. For concreteness, in all the plots below we assume fixed polarization and phase misalignments of 2%, independently of the channel loss. Note that, as pointed out in [33] , the TF-QKD protocol analyzed in this work is quite robust against phase mismatch. This is so because phase misalignment only affects the quantum bit error rate but not the phase error rate. For illustration purposes every plot is obtained for three different values of the dark count rate of the detectors, p d ∈ {10 −6 , 10 −7 , 10 −8 }. The plots are obtained by numerically optimizing the secret key rate -for every value of the loss-over the signal intensity (α 2 ) and over one decoy intensity, while for simplicity the other decoy intensities are fixed to near-to-optimal values for all values of the overall loss. More specifically, we preliminarily performed an optimization of the key rate over the whole set of decoy intensities and noticed that most of them would be roughly constant with the loss. We then fixed such intensities to constant values which are nearly optimal but also reasonable from an experimental point of view, while keeping the optimization over the remaining intensities. The optimal values of the signal and decoy intensities as a function of the loss are also plotted in this Section. In this regard, we also study how the key rate is affected when the intensities are subjected to fluctuations around their optimal values in Subsec. 3.4. Loss Alice-Bob (dB)
Two decoy intensity settings

PLOB bound
Secret key rate Secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall loss in the channels Alice-C and Bob-C for three different dark count rates (10 −6 green, 10 −7 red, 10 −8 blue). The solid lines correspond to the case where the yields Y00, Y02, Y20 and Y11 are estimated by means of two decoy intensity settings through the bounds presented in Sec. 2 and the key rate is optimized over the signal intensity α 2 (see figure 3a ) and the decoy intensity µ0 (see figure 3b ). The other decoy intensity, µ1, is fixed to µ1 = 10 −5 . The dashed lines assume that all the yields are known from the channel model and the secret key rate is optimized over α 2 . That is, these lines show the maximum value of the secret key rate which could be achieved with an infinite number of decoy intensity settings and the security analysis reported in [33] . The solid magenta line illustrates the PLOB bound [19] . The plot shows that in the presence of a dark count rate of at most about p d = 10 −7 the protocol can beat the PLOB bound even with just two decoy intensity settings.
In figure 2 we plot the secret key rate against the overall loss for the case where Alice and Bob use two decoy intensity settings each. The solid lines are obtained by bounding from above the yields Y 00 , Y 02 , Y 20 and Y 11 by means of the expressions derived in Sec. 2 and by optimizing the rate over the signal intensity α 2 and the decoy intensity µ 0 , while the other decoy intensity is fixed to: µ 1 = 10 −5 . The optimal values for α 2 and µ 0 are shown in figure 3a and figure 3b , respectively. The dashed lines are instead obtained by
The optimization is carried out by using the built-in function "NMaximize" of the software Wolfram Mathematica 10.0. employing the exact expression of the yields ¶ which is given by (A.6) for the channel model considered. This represents the ideal scenario in which the parties have an infinite number of decoys through which they can estimate all the yields precisely. Note that in order to obtain the dashed lines in figure 2 we use the exact expression of the yields Y nm only for n, m ≤ 12 while we set the other yields to 1. This is enough to basically reproduce the behavior of the secret key rate when all the infinite number of yields are computed via the channel model's formula given by (A.6), as argued in [33] . The dashed lines are only optimized over the signal intensity, since the yields are directly given by the channel model. Finally, we also insert in figure 2 the PLOB bound on the secret key capacity [19] , which reads as follows in terms of the transmittance η :
In figure 2 we observe that even by means of just two decoy intensity settings the key rate can beat the PLOB bound, provided that the dark count rate is p d 10 −7 . This happens because with two decoys the parties can already non-trivially estimate the yields Y nm with n + m ≤ 2 as we showed in Sec. 2, and these yields are the most relevant terms in the phase-error rate formula given by (1.7) [33] . Note that we did not estimate the yields Y 01 and Y 10 since only the yields Y nm with n + m an even number contribute to the phase-error rate (1.7).
However, figure 2 also shows that there is a sensible gap between the rates where the yields are estimated with two decoys (solid lines) and the best possible rates one could achieve (dashed lines) if all the yields were known. This clearly indicates that, although two decoys allow to estimate the yields of largest contribution in the phase-error rate, such estimations are not sufficiently tight and the ability to estimate a larger number of yields would increase the performance of the protocol. By considering figure 3 and the fixed value of the decoy intensity µ 1 , one notices that the optimal intensities are rather small and thus, in a real experimental implementation, intensity fluctuations might be an issue. In Subsec. 3.4 we address this problem by studying how the key rate is affected under intensity fluctuations and show that for fluctuations up to about 40% the change in the key rate performance is minimal. Also, we notice that the optimal values of the signal intensity α 2 (see figure 3a ) and the decoy intensity µ 0 (see figure 3b ) are almost constant with the loss, for losses 20 dB. This means that in a scenario where the loss in the quantum channels varies dynamically with time within a reasonable interval, one could still fix the signal intensity and both decoy intensities to constant values which happen to be close ¶ By "exact expression" we mean that if the experimental apparatus were accurately described by the channel model in Appendix A, then the yields associated to that experimental setup would be precisely predicted by (A.6).
to the optimal ones. This argument also holds in the case of three (see Subsec. 3.2) and four decoy intensity settings (see Subsec. 3.3).
Three decoy intensity settings
PLOB bound Loss Alice-Bob (dB)
Secret key rate Fig. 4 : Secret key rate in logarithmic scale as a function of the overall loss in the channels Alice-C and Bob-C for three different dark count rates (10 −6 green, 10 −7 red, 10 −8 blue). The solid lines correspond to the case where the yields Y00, Y02, Y20, Y11, Y13, Y31, Y04, Y40 and Y22 are estimated by means of three decoy intensity settings through the bounds presented in Appendix B and the key rate is optimized over the signal intensity α 2 (see figure 5a ) and the decoy intensity µ0 (see figure 5b ). The other decoy intensities are fixed to µ1 = 10 −4 and µ2 = 10 −5 . The dashed lines assume that all the yields are known from the channel model and the secret key rate is optimized over α 2 . That is, these lines show the maximum value of the secret key rate which could be achieved with an infinite number of decoy intensity settings and the security analysis reported in [33] . The solid magenta line illustrates the PLOB bound [19] . The plot shows that already with three decoy intensity settings the key rate (solid lines) is sensibly close to the ideal one in which all the yields are known (dashed lines), meaning that the contribution of the other yields trivially bounded by 1 in the phase error rate is minimal.
In figure 4 we plot the secret key rate against the overall loss for the case where Alice and Bob use three decoy intensity settings each. The solid lines are obtained by bounding from above the relevant yields Y nm such that n + m ≤ 4 (i.e. we upper bound the yields
. The exact expressions for the different upper bounds on the yields can be found in Appendix B, and we omit them here for simplicity. The solid lines are optimized over the signal intensity α 2 and the decoy intensity µ 0 , while the other two decoy intensities are fixed for simplicity to µ 1 = 10 −4 and µ 2 = 10 −5 .
The optimal values for α 2 and µ 0 are shown in figure 5a and figure 5b, respectively. The dashed lines are again obtained by employing the exact expression of the yields given by the channel model (A.6) and coincide with those plotted in figure 2. We observe in figure 4 that the use of three decoys yields a significant improvement in the protocol's performance with respect to the two-decoys case (see figure 2 ). As a matter of fact, in figure 4 the solid lines are almost overlapping the dashed lines for most values of the channel loss. This is due to the fact that with three decoys the parties constrain the yields with nine independent equations (instead of four equations as in the two-decoys case), which enable a tighter estimation of Y 00 , Y 02 , Y 20 and Y 11 and the non-trivial estimation of five additional yields. Moreover, in the case of three decoys the optimal signal intensity α 2 (see figure 5a ) is roughly double the value of the correspondent intensity when using two decoys (see figure 3a ). The reason for this is connected to the role of α 2 in the protocol's key rate. In fact, the prefactor p(k c , k d ) with k c + k d = 1 of the key rate formula given by (1.3) increases for increasing α 2 : the higher the mean number of photons sent by the parties (within certain limits) the higher the probability of having a click in one of the two detectors. On the other hand, increasing α 2 excessively also affects the phase-error rate. Note that by setting some yields to 1 in the phase error rate formula given by (1.7) we give rise to addends like c 2n c 2m and c 2n+1 c 2m+1 which increase for increasing α 2 , leading to an overall increase of the phase-error rate and thus decrease of the key rate. The optimal value of α 2 is thus given by the trade-off between the effect of the prefactor p(k c , k d ) and that of the terms c 2n c 2m and c 2n+1 c 2m+1 . Now, by noting that the contribution of the therms c 2n c 2m and c 2n+1 c 2m+1 decreases for increasing n, m, we understand that their negative effect on the key rate is diminished in the case of three decoys since we non-trivially estimate more yields, i.e. a lower number of yields is set to 1. This allows α 2 to acquire higher values with respect to the two-decoys case, as we observed in figure 5a. Finally we point out that such an argument does not apply to the discussion about the optimal value of the decoy intensity µ 0 in the case of two and three decoys. As a matter of fact, the key rate does not depend on the decoy intensities in the same way as on the signal intensity: the decoy intensities only appear in the yields' bounds inserted in the phase-error rate. Additionally, the analytical bounds on the yields when using two or three decoys cannot be compared in a straightforward way. Nonetheless we observe a similar behavior of the optimal µ 0 for two (see figure 3b ) and three decoys (see figure 5b ).
Four decoy intensity settings
In figure 6 we plot the secret key rate against the overall loss for the case where Alice and Bob use four decoy intensity settings each. Like in the three-decoys case, the solid lines are obtained by bounding from 40 and Y 22 by means of four decoys. In particular, for the yields Y 00 , Y 02 , Y 20 , Y 11 and Y 22 we use the exact same analytical bounds derived with three decoys since they are tight enough, and the use of a fourth decoy intensity would just make them more cumbersome without providing a significant improvement of the resulting secret key rate. For the remaining four yields we instead derived tighter bounds with the help of the fourth intensity µ 3 (see Appendix C). The solid lines are obtained by optimizing the rate over the signal intensity α 2 and the fourth decoy intensity µ 3 , while the other decoy intensities are fixed to µ 0 = 10 −3 , µ 1 = 10 −4 and µ 2 = 10 −5 . Note that for convenience, unlike the previous cases of two and three decoy intensity settings, here we fix the intensity µ 0 and we optimize over the fourth decoy intensity Loss Alice-Bob (dB)
Secret key rate for three different dark count rates (10 −6 green, 10 −7 red, 10 −8 blue). The solid lines correspond to the case where the yields Y00, Y02, Y20, Y11 and Y22 are estimated by means of three decoys through the bounds presented in Appendix B (i.e., for simplicity here we disregard the information provided by the additional fourth decoy intensity setting) and Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40 are estimated with four decoys via the bounds in Appendix C. The key rate is optimized over the signal intensity α 2 (see figure 7a ) and the decoy intensity µ3 (see figure 7b ), while the other decoy intensities are fixed to µ0 = 10 −3 , µ1 = 10 −4 and µ2 = 10 −5 . The dashed lines are optimized over α 2 and assume that all the yields are known from the channel model. They correspond to the maximum value of the secret key rate which could be achieved with an infinite number of decoy intensity settings. The solid magenta line illustrates the PLOB bound [19] . The plot indicates that the tighter estimation of the yields Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40 with respect to the case of three decoy intensity settings is enough to basically reproduce the ideal scenario in which all the yields are known (dashed lines).
With four decoys (see figure 6 ) the key rates basically reproduces the ideal ones (dashed lines) in which all the yields are known, with the gap being at maximum of 1 dB at the very end of the plot lines (i.e. in the very high loss regime). This demonstrates that there is no need to bound further yields than the nine yields we bounded in the cases of three and four decoys. Of course, the tighter estimation of the yields Y 13 , Y 31 , Y 04 and Y 40 achieved with four decoys results in an improvement of the key rate with respect to the case of three decoys (see figure 4 ), especially in the region of high losses.
Concerning the optimal signal intensity (see figure 7a ), we notice a slight increase with respect to the three-decoys case (see figure 5a ) due to the tighter estimation of some yields in the phase-error rate formula, which allows their correspondent coefficients to acquire a slightly higher value under an increase of α 2 . Finally, the reason why the optimal µ 3 plot (see figure 7b ) looks quite different from the optimal µ 0 plots for the cases of two and three decoys (see figure 3b and figure 5b) is that here we optimize over a decoy intensity (µ 3 ) which appears only in some of the yields' bounds -namely Y 13 , Y 31 , Y 04 and Y 40 -, while in the previous cases the optimization was performed over a decoy intensity (µ 0 ) which appears in all the yields' bounds.
Intensity fluctuations
Here we investigate the robustness of the TF-QKD protocol against intensity fluctuations that may occur in the preparation of the pulses sent by Alice and Bob. This is motivated by the fact that the optimal signal and decoy intensities that the parties should adopt in order to maximize the key rate for a given loss are quite small, thus the effect of intensity fluctuations might be an issue in practice. On the other hand, we also note that the optimal value of a given decoy or signal intensity is either constant or varies The difference between this plot and the optimal µ0 plots (see figure 3b and figure 5b) in the case of two and three decoys is due to the fact that, unlike µ0, the intensity µ3 does not appear in all the yields' bounds since we used the fourth decoy just for bounding Y13, Y31, Y04 and Y40. very moderately with the loss.
Here we consider the simple scenario in which the signal and all the decoy intensities suffer from a fluctuation of magnitude 30%, 40% or 50% around their optimal value. This means for example that, for a fluctuation say of 30%, the signal intensity α 2 and all the decoy intensities µ k fluctuate in the intervals: 0.7 α 2 opt ≤ α 2 ≤ 1.3 α 2 opt and 0.7 µ opt k ≤ µ k ≤ 1.3 µ opt k , respectively, where α 2 opt and µ opt k represent the optimal values. We then account for the worst-case scenario by numerically minimizing the key rate over all the intensities constrained in their respective fluctuation interval. Only in this way we can still guarantee that the resulting key rate is associated to a secure protocol. Fig. 8 : Comparison of the secret key rate with optimal signal and decoys intensities (dashed lines, computed in Sec. 3) with the secret key rates affected by increasing intensity fluctuations (solid lines): 30%,40% and 50% (brighter colors; right to left). We assume that the fluctuations affect each decoy intensity and the signal intensity as well. The plots show that the TF-QKD protocol is quite robust against intensity fluctuations, and that its robustness increases with the number of decoys.
PLOB bound
The results of this study are given in figure 8 . Here we plot the original key rates -i.e. without fluctuations of the signal and decoy intensities-as dashed lines + and the key rates affected by intensity fluctuations as solid lines. The plots are given for the same dark count rates and misalignments used in Sec. 3, in the case of two, three and four decoy intensity settings. The color of the solid lines becomes brighter for increasing fluctuation magnitude.
We observe that the performance of the protocol is considerably affected by intensity fluctuations in the case of two decoys, while the effect becomes almost negligible for three and four decoys. The reason for this lies in the fact that the tightness of the yields' bounds has a stronger dependence on the value of the decoy intensities when the number of decoys -and thus constraints on the yields-is low. In other words, if the parties have at their disposal a larger number of decoys, they can properly combine the numerous constraints on the yields and obtain inherently tight bounds, i.e. bounds that are tight regardless of the actual values of the intensities involved. If, instead, the parties have few decoys, say two, then the bounds they derive on the yields can be tight or loose depending on the values assigned to the decoy intensities, since the constraints on the yields are fewer.
In conclusion, in the case of two decoys the parties can tolerate intensity fluctuations up to 40%, which correspond to a decrease in the protocol's key rate especially in the high-loss region, quantified by a reduction of about 5 to 6 dB of the maximum tolerated loss * . Remarkably, with three decoys the decrease of the maximum tolerated loss would be under 5 dB for fluctuations up to 50%. Finally, for four decoys the protocol's performance remains almost the same for fluctuations up to about 50% around the optimal values. We deduce that the TF-QKD protocol introduced in [33] seems to be quite robust against intensity fluctuations.
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated in detail the performance of the Twin-Field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) protocol presented in [33] in the realistic scenario of a finite number of decoy intensity settings at the parties' disposal. Indeed, the protocol requires that Alice and Bob use the decoy-state method [35] [36] [37] to estimate the phase-error rate by upper bounding certain yields. Unlike most QKD protocols which employ such method, in this case the protocol's key rate depends -in principle-on infinitely many yields and it is essential to upper bound (rather than lower bound) their values. Clearly, the more yields the parties tightly upper bound, the better the protocol's performance is. We have introduced a tight analytical method to perform such estimation when Alice and Bob use two, three or four decoy intensity settings each. The yields' analytical bounds provided in this work imply a fully-analytical expression for the protocol's secret key rate, which is very convenient for performance optimization (e.g. in the finite-key scenario).
In so doing, we have shown that the TF-QKD protocol can beat the PLOB bound [19] even with just two decoys for reasonable values of the setup parameters, which include: the loss, the dark count rate, the polarization misalignment and the phase mismatch. Furthermore the plots assuming four decoys demonstrate that one can approximately achieve the best possible performance by tightly estimating only nine yields. The optimization of the key rate over the signal and decoy intensities indicates that their optimal values are all either constant or weakly-dependent on the loss of the channel. This means that the protocol is particularly suitable for contexts where the channel loss varies in time, for instance in the scalable MDI-QKD networks conceived in [40] . Finally we have investigated the scenario where the intensities of the optical states prepared by Alice and Bob are affected by fluctuations and observed that the protocol seems to be very robust against such phenomena. A natural continuation of this work would take into account the finite-key effects due to the finite number of pulses sent by the parties to the central relay. This could be done by combining the results presented in this paper with the finite-keys estimation techniques used in [38] .
Appendix A. Channel model
The channel model that we employ to simulate the gains that would be observed experimentally in the X-basis (i.e. the probabilities p(k c , k d |b A , b B )) and Z-basis (i.e. the probabilities Q k,l kc,k d ) is taken from [33] . In all the expressions of this Section we assume k c + k d = 1. In particular, a beam splitter of transmittance √ η accounts for the loss in the quantum channel linking Alice (Bob) to node C and for the non-unity detection efficiency of detectors D c and D d . The polarization misalignment introduced by the channel Alice-C (Bob-C) is modeled with a unitary operation mapping the polarization input modes a † in (b † in ) to the orthogonal polarization output modes a † out and a † out⊥
, for an angle θ A (θ B ). Moreover, the phase mismatch between Alice and Bob's signals arriving at node C is modeled by shifting the phase of Bob's signals by an angle φ = δπ, for a certain parameter δ. Finally the model considers that both detectors are affected by a dark count probability p d , which is independent of the signals received and has the same value for both detectors. With this setup, the gains in the X-basis can be written as:
where γ = √ ηα 2 (with α being the amplitude of the signal states) and
with θ = θ A −θ B . Starting from (A.1), one can readily compute the probability p(k c , k d ) and the bit-error rate e kc,k d by means of equations (1.4) and (1.5),(1.6), respectively:
(A.4)
The gains in the Z-basis instead read:
where the function I(z) = 1 2πi e (z/2)(t+1/t) t −1 dt is the modified Bessel function of first kind. In the simulations shown in Sec. 3 we compare the key rate computed with our analytical bounds on the yields with the key rate evaluated with the exact expressions of the yields, i.e. the expressions obtained directly from the channel model. According to the above channel model, the yields read:
To conclude, we remark that all the quantities entering the key rate formula (1. 
Appendix B. Yields' bounds with three decoys
Here we derive analytical upper bounds on the yields appearing in (1.7), following the same lines of Sec. 2. In this case we assume that Alice and Bob can prepare their phase-randomized coherent pulses with three different intensity settings: {µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 }, which are the same for both parties. This choice is optimal since we assumed that the two optical channels linking the parties to the central node C have equal transmittance √ η [40] .
The whole set of infinite yields is subjected to the following nine equality constraints: Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y 1m and Y n1 are removed (i.e. their coefficients are equal to zero):
where the superscripts in G k,l 22 indicate which intensities are involved, while the subscripts indicate the yield that is going to be bounded. We now combine G 0,1 22 , G 0,2 22 and G 1,2 22 with arbitrary real coefficients c 0 and c 1 and impose that the resulting expression has the yields Y 0m and Y n0 removed as well:
3) Note that the linear combination above is already the most general for our needs. As a matter of fact, for every linear combination of G 0,1 22 , G 0,2 22 and G 1,2 22 one can always factor out the coefficient in front of G 0,1 22 , as far as it is not zero. However, if the particular combination of gains which removes the terms Y 0m and Y n0 has a null coefficient in front of G 0,1 22 , for symmetry reasons there would also exist another combination -that also removes the yields Y 0m and Y n0 -with a null coefficient in front of say G 0, 2 22 , and this one could be found in our case given by (B.3). For Y 0m and Y n0 to be removed in (B.3) it suffices that:
5)
A sufficient condition for this is that every coefficient of µ m i is identically zero, which happens for:
Substituting (B.6) and (B.7) back into (B.3) and multiplying both sides by µ 2 , we get an expression where all the terms Y 0m , Y 1m , Y n0 and Y n1 are removed and where the term Y 22 gives the largest contribution:
In order to extract a bound for Y 22 we need to recast the yields' coefficients in such a way that their sign becomes manifest. Each term of the sum in (B.8) may be recast as follows:
or equivalently as:
We can now rewrite factor A 22 as:
Of course we can employ this expression also for A 22 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , n), under the substitution m → n. We will apply this consideration from now on to similar scenarios. By substituting (B.12) into (B.10), we get the final expression for each term of the sum in (B.8):
That is, the sign of Y nm 's coefficient is independent of n and m and it is the same for all terms in (B.8) (note that the product of the two sums in (B.13) is always positive). Thus a valid upper bound for Y 22 is obtained by setting all the other yields to zero in (B.8), except for Y 22 . We obtain:
which implies the following expression for the upper bound on Y 22 :
We remark that the bound given by (B.15) is not valid when any of the intensities µ 0 , µ 1 or µ 2 is equal to zero. As a matter of fact, in any of these cases the starting expression given by (B.8) becomes trivial. However, in most practical situations, due to the finite extinction ratio of amplitude modulators, none of the decoy intensities is actually equal to zero.
Appendix B.2. Upper bound on Y 11
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y 0m and Y n0 are removed:
We now combine G 0,1 11 , G 0,2 11 and G 1,2 11 with arbitrary real coefficients c 0 and c 1 and impose that the resulting expression has the yields Y 2m and Y n2 also removed:
For Y 2m and Y n2 to be removed it suffices:
,
.
(B.20)
Substituting these terms back into (B.17) yields a combination of gains in which the terms Y 0m , Y n0 , Y 2m and Y n2 are removed:
(B.21)
In order to get a valid upper bound for Y 11 we need to determine the signs of the coefficients of the remaining yields. We start by recasting each term of the sum in (B.21) corresponding to the Y nm , with n, m ≥ 3, as follows:
The factor A 11 can be rewritten as: 
so that its sign is manifestly dependent on the factor (µ 0 − µ 2 )(µ 1 − µ 2 ). In a similar fashion, one can rewrite each term of the sum in (B.21) corresponding to the Y 1m , with m ≥ 3, as:
thus deducing that this expression has opposite sign with respect to that given by (B.25). Same holds for Y n1 , since it can be shown that its coefficient is exactly (B.26) with the substitution m → n.
Finally, by showing that the term corresponding to Y 11 in (B.21) can be factorized as:
one concludes that this expression has the same sign as that given by (B.25).
Putting together these considerations into (B.21), a valid upper bound on Y 11 is obtained when the yields Y nm , with n, m ≥ 3, are set to zero and the yields Y 1m and Y n1 are set to their maximum allowed value. Since in Appendix B.5 and Appendix B.6 we derive upper bounds on Y 13 and Y 31 (see B.65 and B.73), we can employ them in (B.21) instead of trivially bounding these yields with 1. In this way we obtain:
which leads to the following upper bound on Y 11 :
where the term E 11 is defined as: Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y 1m and , Y n0 are removed:
We now combine G 0,1 02 , G 0,2 02 and G 1,2 02 with arbitrary real coefficients c 0 and c 1 and impose that the resulting expression has the yields Y 2m and Y n1 also removed:
For Y 2m and Y n1 to be removed the coefficients c 0 and c 1 must satisfy:
or equivalently:
(B.34)
A sufficient condition for this is that the coefficient of every µ n i and every µ m i is identically zero. This imposes six conditions on c 0 and c 1 , however thanks to the inherent symmetries of the system a solution exists, and reads:
Substituting these expressions back into (B.32) and multiplying both sides by µ 2 , yields a combination of gains in which the terms Y n0 , Y n1 , Y 1m and Y 2m are removed. In particular, we obtain:
In order to get a valid upper bound for Y 02 and Y 04 we need to study the sign of the coefficients of the remaining yields. We start by recasting each term of the sum corresponding to the Y nm , with n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2, in (B.37) as follows:
and A 22 is the one found when bounding Y 22 , thus we know from (B.12) it can be recast as:
We can rewrite B 02 as: 
which means that the sign of this expression is fully determined by the factor (µ 1 − µ 2 )(µ 0 − µ 2 ) (note that the product of the two sums in (B.42) is always positive).
Concerning the terms that appear in the sum in (B.37) corresponding to the Y 0m , with m ≥ 2, we have:
where we used (B.11) in the first equality and (B.40) in the second equality. Expression (B.43) implies that its sign is always equal to the sign of the terms given by (B.42), since it is determined by the same factor (µ 1 − µ 2 )(µ 0 − µ 2 ) (note that the product of the last two factors in (B.43) is always positive). A valid upper bound on Y 02 is thus obtained by setting all the other yields to zero in (B.37). By doing so, we obtain:
One can do the same when bounding Y 04 , i.e. setting all the other yields to zero except for Y 04 , in (B.37). We find that: 
(B.45)
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y 0m and Y n1 are removed:
We now combine G 0,1 20 , G 0,2 20 and G 1,2 20 with arbitrary real coefficients c 0 and c 1 and impose that the resulting expression has the yields Y 1m and Y n2 also removed:
(B.47) For Y 1m and Y n2 to be removed the coefficients c 0 and c 1 must satisfy:
(B.48) This system of linear equations coincides with the one given by (B.33) that we found when bounding Y 02 , thus the solution is given by (B.35) for c 0 and by (B.36) for c 1 . Substituting these expressions back into (B.47) and multiplying both sides by µ 2 , yields a combination of gains in which the terms Y n1 , Y n2 , Y 0m and Y 1m are removed:
Since the coefficients of Y n0 and Y nm coincide with those found when bounding Y 02 if one exchanges m ←→ n, we can directly use the results obtained in Appendix B.3 to recast the terms that contain the Y nm with n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3. In particular, according to (B.42), we obtain:
and according to (B.43) the terms that contain the yields Y n0 can be written as: 
One can do the same to bound Y 40 , i.e. to set all the other yields to zero, except for Y 40 . In this case we obtain:
We look for that combination of gains in which all the terms proportional to Y n0 , Y n1 , Y 0m and Y 2m are removed. In order to find it, we consider the most general combination of all gains:
and impose proper conditions on the real coefficients c i,j : 
(B.59)
By substituting (B.59) back into (B.54) we get an expression in which the terms Y n0 , Y n1 , Y 0m and Y 2m are removed:
where A 22 is the factor given by (B.11) also present in the bounds for Y 02 and Y 22 , whereas A 11 is the factor given by (B.23) which appears in the bound on Y 11 . Note that this is somehow expected: when bounding Y 02 and Y 22 we removed the terms Y n0 and Y n1 as we just did for Y 13 , and in bounding Y 11 we removed the terms Y 0m and Y 2m as we did here. Therefore, by exploiting the result given by (B.12) we can recast each term of the sum corresponding to the Y 1m , with m ≥ 2, in (B.60) as:
and realize that it is always negative, regardless of the value of the intensities. By employing the results (B.12, B.24) we can recast each term of the sum corresponding to the Y nm with n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2, in (B.60) as:
and realize that it is always positive , regardless of the intensities. A valid upper bound on Y 13 is then obtained by setting Y 1m → 0 (except for Y 13 ) and Y nm → 1 for all n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2 in (B.60). As a result we obtain:
(B.64)
We thus obtain the following upper bound on Y 13 :
where G 13 is defined in (B.54) and the coefficients of the combination of gains in (B.59).
Appendix B.6. Upper bound on Y 31 We look for that combination of gains in which all the terms proportional to Y n0 , Y n2 , Y 0m and Y 1m are removed. In order to find it, we proceed like in the previous case. That is, we consider the most general combination of all gains:
and impose proper conditions on the real coefficients c i,j :
(B.71)
By substituting (B.71) back into (B.66) we get an expression in which the terms Y n0 , Y n2 , Y 0m and Y 1m are removed: 
where G 31 is defined in (B.66) and the coefficients of the combination of gains in (B.71).
Appendix B.7. Upper bound on Y 00
Consider the following combinations of gains in which all the terms Y 1m and Y n1 are removed:
We now combine G 0,1 00 , G 0,2 00 and G 1,2 00 with arbitrary real coefficients c 0 and c 1 and impose that the terms Y 2m and Y n2 are also removed in the resulting expression:
For Y 2m and Y n2 to be removed it suffices that for every m it holds:
which is fulfilled by:
, (B.77)
(B.78)
Substituting (B.77) and (B.78) back into (B.75) and multiplying both sides by µ 2 2 , we get an expression where all the terms Y 0m , Y 2m , Y n0 and Y n2 are removed and where the term Y 00 gives the largest contribution. More precisely, we find that:
In order to extract an upper bound on Y 00 we need to study the sign of the yields' coefficients. We start by recasting the term corresponding to Y 00 as:
We observe that the sign of this expression is determined by the factors (µ 1 − µ 2 )(µ 0 − µ 2 ). We then proceed by recasting each term of the sum corresponding to the Y nm , with n, m ≥ 3 in (B.79) as: Y nm n! m! A 00 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , m) · A 00 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , n)
This factor can be rewritten as:
where A 22 is defined as (B.11) in Appendix B.1. Thus we can use the result (B.12) obtained in Appendix B.1 to directly recast A 00 as: 
which has manifestly the same sign as the expression given by (B.80), for any value of the intensities (the product of the last two factors is always positive). Finally, we recast the Y 0m 's terms (Y n0 's terms are identical under the replacement m → n) as:
where we employed (B.83) in the first equality and (B.84) in the second one. We observe that the sign of the Y 0m 's terms is again determined by the factors (µ 0 − µ 2 )(µ 1 − µ 2 ). We conclude that the coefficients of Y 0m , Y n0 and Y nm , with n, m ≥ 3, carry the same sign as Y 00 's, which implies that a valid upper bound on Y 00 is obtained by setting all the other yields to zero in (B.79). In so doing, we find that:
Appendix C. Yields' bounds with four decoys
Here we derive analytical upper bounds on the yields appearing in (1.7), following the same lines of Sec. 2. In this case we assume that Alice and Bob can prepare their phase-randomized coherent pulses with four different intensity settings: {µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 }, which are the same for both parties. This choice is optimal since we assumed that the two optical channels linking the parties to the central node C have equal transmittance √ η [40] .
The whole set of infinite yields is subjected to the following sixteen equality constraints: In (C.7,C.8) we again assume that the indexes in the sums run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and we define i1≤i2≤...≤im−3 µ i1 µ i2 · . . . · µ im−3 | m=3 = 1. From (C.7) we deduce that the sign of Y 0m 's coefficient is independent of m, while from (C.8) we deduce that Y nm 's coefficient has always opposite sign to that of Y 0m . Therefore a valid upper bound on Y 04 is obtained by setting to zero all the other yields Y 0m and to 1 the yields Y nm with n ≥ 4 and m ≥ 3 in (C.6). We thus obtain:
B 04 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , n, m) n! m! , (C.9) which implies the following upper bound on Y 04 :
B 04 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , n, m) n! m!    , (C.10)
where c i,j are given in (C.5), G i,j 04 is defined in (C.2), the coefficient A 04 reads:
and the sum over the coefficient B 04 reads:
(C.12)
Appendix C.2. Upper bound on Y 40
Y nm n! m! (µ n i − µ n j )(µ j µ m i − µ i µ m j ) , (C. 13) where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Since G i,i 40 = 0 and G i,j 40 = G j,i 40 , we only have six distinct combinations that read (for j > i): G 0,1 40 , G 0,2 40 , G 0,3 40 , G 1,2 40 , G 1,3 40 , G 2,3 40 . We now take the linear combination of the G i,j 40 such that even the yields Y 1m , Y 2m , Y n2 and Y n3 are removed:
where we implicitly assume that both indexes i, j run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3}. For Y 1m , Y 2m , Y n2 and Y n3 to be removed, the real coefficients c i,j must satisfy:
(C. 15) We now notice that the system (C.15) is exactly the same system solved in Appendix C.2 while bounding Y 04 , thus the solution for the coefficients c i,j is given in (C.5). By substituting the solution (C.5) back into (C.14), one gets: where c i,j , G i,j 40 , A 04 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , 4) and the sum over B 04 are given in (C.5), (C.13), (C.11) and (C.12), respectively.
(C.25)
By substituting these expressions back into (C.18) and by making some simplifications, one gets:
Y nm n! m! A 13 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , m) · C n , (C. 26) where:
and C n (n ≥ 5) is defined recursively as:
C n = n−4 j=1 (µ j 0 + µ j 1 + µ j 2 + µ j 3 )C n−j − µ 0 µ 1 µ 2 µ 3 i1≤i2≤...≤in−5 µ i1 µ i2 · . . . · µ in−5 /(n − 4) C 4 = µ 0 µ 1 µ 2 + µ 0 µ 1 µ 3 + µ 0 µ 2 µ 3 + µ 1 µ 2 µ 3 .
(C. 28) In (C.27,C.28) we assume that the indexes i j in the sums run over the set {0, 1, 2, 3} and we define i1≤i2≤...≤im−3 µ i1 µ i2 · . . . · µ im−3 | m=3 = 1. From (C.27) we deduce that the sign of Y 1m 's coefficient is always positive, while from (C.28) we deduce that Y nm 's coefficient has always equal sign to that of Y 1m , since C n is always a positive quantity. Therefore a valid upper bound on Y 13 is obtained by setting to zero all the other yields in (C.26). The upper bound on Y 13 then reads:
where c i,j are defined in (C.25) and A 13 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , 3) reads:
(C.38)
By substituting these expressions back into (C.31) and by making some simplifications, one gets:
Y nm n! m! A 13 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , n) · C m , (C. 39) where A 13 and C m also appear in Appendix C.3 when bounding Y 13 and are defined as (C.27) and (C.28), respectively. Thus, following the same lines of Appendix C.3, we conclude that all yields in (C.39) are multiplied by a positive factor. A valid upper bound on Y 31 is then obtained by setting to zero all the other yields in (C.39). We obtain:
where c i,j and A 13 (µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 , 3) are defined in (C. 38 ) and (C.30), respectively.
